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# MAINTENANCE AND DIAGNOSTICS MANUAL

## **MIREL VZ1**

Train Protection System

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# v04

Additional source files:

No.	File	Page	Pages	Description
1				
2				
3				

Changes:

Version	Description	Approved by
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170624	Modification of prophylactic control conditions of D4	Michalec
180115	Changing conditions of assembly and disassembly	Michalec
190111	Completion and Maintenance of Document in Accordance with Technical Conditions	Horváth

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# 1 Purpose of the Document

This Maintenance and Diagnostics Manual for the MIREL VZ1 train protection system, version v04, is based on the Maintenance and Diagnostics Manual for the MIREL VZ1 train protection system **154-99-SW-4P-VZ dated 15 June 2000**.

The following addenda have been incorporated into the manual:

1. Addendum 1 dated 11 October 2000 to the Maintenance and Diagnostics Manual for the MIREL VZ1 train protection system based on requirements for technical security of the system (added in sections: D1 – Start-up self-diagnostic control, D2 – Continuous self-diagnostic control, D4 – Prophylactic control, Fault indication).
2. Addendum 2 dated 11 May 2004 to the Maintenance and Diagnostics Manual for the MIREL VZ1 train protection system based on the approval of Addendum 1 to the Technical Conditions for Serial Installation of the MIREL VZ1 Train Protection System (257-00-TW-4P-VZ, 5 March 2004).
3. Incorporation of functionalities based on EVM specifications dated 17 January 2006 on the basis of the Set of Functional Requirements for MÁV Rt On-board Train Protection Systems and Vigilance Equipment (738-06-TW-4P-VZ, 12 January 2006), the Specification of Changes to the MIREL VZ1 Train Protection System - integration of MÁV Rt functions (412-02-FW-4P-VZ, 15 January 2006) and Addendum 2 to the Technical Conditions for Serial Installation of the MIREL VZ1 Train Protection System (257-00-TW-4P-VZ, 16 January 2006).
4. Modification of functionalities based on LS specifications after completion of test operations for program version v03 and expansion of functionality based on EVM specifications for track speeds of up to  $160 \text{ km.h}^{-1}$  based on the Set of Functional Requirements for MÁV Rt On-board Train Protection Systems and Vigilance Equipment (738VZ1: 081020).
5. Addition of functionalities based on SHP specifications on the basis of the Basic Specifications and SHP Technical Description (1054VZ1 : 120910) including the incorporation of comments from operations.
6. Completion and adjustment of Maintenance and Diagnostics Manual for MIREL VZ1 train protection in accordance with system technical conditions (257VZ1 : 110610). Addition of functionality to support stand-by regime and cooperation with ETCS-type train protection systems.
7. Completion and adjustment of Maintenance and Diagnostics Manual for MIREL VZ1 train protection in accordance with technical conditions of systems (257VZ1 : 190121). Completion of procedure for data reading from recording device. Completion of diagnostics and error codes when integrating with MIREL SHPE device.



## 2 General Characteristics

The MIREL VZ1 train protection system is the mobile unit of the train protection system. It is designed for locomotives operating in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. The system is compatible with LS and EVM type track infrastructure. The system cooperates with ETCS and SHP type on-board train protection system equipment. MIREL VZ1 is an open system that may be expanded in the future to accommodate different types of systems used to transmit track information to locomotives.

The MIREL VZ1 train protection system is specifically designed to monitor engineer vigilance, transmit information from track infrastructure to the engineer's cab, check maximum speed with respect to the maximum design speed of the locomotive and the speed set point and receive information from track infrastructure. Other system functions monitor for a match between the selected and actual direction of travel, assess radio commands to remotely stop the locomotive and check the braking of a stopped locomotive.

A complete MIREL VZ1 train protection system includes the central unit, two signal repeaters at both of the engineer's cabs and two signal horns. A serial communication link connects the central unit to the signal repeaters. It is also possible to operate a single signal repeater depending on the required configuration of the system. MIREL VZ1 is configurable for single and double cab locomotives. The system is configurable for locomotives that must transmit information from the track infrastructure to the engineer's cab and for locomotives operated on track without train protection system infrastructure. The MIREL VZ1 train protection system is operable on electric and diesel locomotives and in control cab rolling stock.

The locomotive's on-board battery source is used to power the MIREL VZ1 train protection system. MIREL VZ1 configuration is dependent upon battery source voltage. The train protection system is operated and controlled exclusively from the engineer's cab using the signal repeater and other controls, including dead man's buttons and other controls on the locomotive's control panel. No interference into the mechanical space of the locomotive is required to operate the MIREL VZ1 train protection system.

The MIREL VZ1 train protection system is a digital electronic system designed specifically as secure equipment. Secure operation is ensured by a pair of processor units, a group of special watch-dog circuits, two-channel transmission of information from track infrastructure, and two-channel measurements of speed, travelled distance and direction of travel. The signal repeaters are composed of redundant single-board computers designed specifically for this use. The components used in the central unit meet demanding criteria for reliability and robustness.

The MIREL VZ1 train protection system conducts start-up and continuous self-diagnostic controls and supports a functional test to ensure the proper function of all parts of the MIREL VZ1 train protection system and cooperating functional units. The system is maintenance-free apart from the performance of the functional test and prophylactic control.

### 3 System Configuration

**Complete configuration:**


- Central unit 1
- Signal repeater 2
- Horn 2

**Required sub-assemblies:**

- Dead man's buttons and pedals number/type given by type of locomotive
- Incremental RPM sensor 1
- Main brake pipe pressure sensor 1
- Recording equipment 1

**Optional sub-assemblies:**

- Track infrastructure signal sensors optional configurations: 4, 2 or 0
- Speedometer depending on type of locomotive
- Control system or ARR depending on type of locomotive
- Radio depending on type of locomotive
- SHP system depending on type of locomotive
- ETCS system depending on type of locomotive



Note: System composition diagram is illustrative. Components of system composition can have various design versions

## 4 Central Unit

The central unit performs the majority of the safety and operational functions of the MIREL VZ1 train protection system.

- Filtering and decoding transmitted information from track infrastructure
- Filtering and evaluation of the signal from the incremental RPM sensor on the locomotive (measuring speed travelled distance and direction of travel)
- Calculation of safety algorithms
- Monitoring pressure in the main brake line
- Monitoring inputs (control switches, dead man's buttons and pedals, drive controllers, the direct acting brake, direction controllers, traction system switch, etc.)
- Sending outputs (controlling the EPV valve, horns, blue and red indicators, etc.)
- Communication with the signal repeaters
- System diagnostics
- System functional test
- Indicators

8 LED indicators are installed on the front panel of the central unit. No control elements are located on the central unit and there is no need for the operator to interfere with the central unit during operation of the train protection system.

The central unit is powered from the locomotive's battery source. Power is provided through a separate circuit breaker dedicated for the train protection system installed with other breakers for the locomotive or in another specific location depending on the specific type of locomotive. There is no operating situation where switching off the system's power breaker is required. Other MIREL VZ1 train protection system peripherals are powered by the central unit.


The central unit in BOXTUX version is constructed with a 19" width to comply with the IEC 60297 standard for rack-mounted equipment. The design height is a U module = 44.5 mm. Central unit modules are installed in an AL enclosure. Indicators are installed on the front panel. A 72-pin DD-type industrial connector is installed on the rear panel.

Mechanical design of central unit in BOXTUG version have modules of central unit located in a separate AL-box and is available in two different modifications, depending on assembly orientation. Indication elements are located at front panel, 37-pin connector of DB type, 25-pin connector of DB type, 15-pin connector of DB type and two 10-pin industrial connectors of type Hummel M16.

Structural design of central unit in BOXKOG has central unit modules located in a separate AL-box of modular BOXKOG-type structural system, for easy device fitting in standard 19" cases with height 3U. . Indication elements are located at front panel, 37-pin connector of DB type, 25-pin connector of DB type, 15-pin connector of DB type and two 10-pin industrial connectors of type Hummel M16.

The central unit will operate in any position. The central unit is installed inside the locomotive based on the specific type of locomotive. Access to the front panel without requiring any disassembly is sufficient for ordinary operating conditions and when maintenance is required.

▪ **Indication elements on central unit front panel**



Illustrative picture

<b>CLK</b>	ZJ1	Indication of operation
<b>MEM</b>	ZJ2	Indication of D1 diagnostics
<b>WD</b>	ZJ3	Indication of D2 diagnostics
<b>K</b>	ZJ4	Indication of information transfer from line part
<b>SPI</b>	ZJ5	Indication of communication on SPI bus
<b>ST1</b>	ZJ6	Indication of communication with 1 <sup>st</sup> driver cab
<b>ST2</b>	ZJ7	Indication of communication with 2 <sup>nd</sup> driver cab
<b>ERR</b>	ZJ8	System error

Full designation of indicators is OIZJ1 through OIZJ8. In order to achieve transparency of Operating Manual, we shall present abbreviated designation ZJ1 through ZJ8.



## 5 Signal Repeater

The signal repeater displays information sent the track infrastructure to the engineer's cab, signals the detected carrier frequency of the signal in the track-side part of the train protection system, signals actions taken by the train protection system and displays maximum speed. It is also used to configure the operating parameters of the train protection system by the operator.

The unit is connected to the central unit with a four conductor cable that powers the signal repeater and secures data communication between the central unit and the signal repeater.

The signal repeater is installed inside of a stand-alone AI enclosure or is a control panel-mounted device. 4 signal signs, blue light, 4 LED indicators, a three-digit alphanumeric display and three control buttons are installed on the front. A flexible cabling bundle is installed on the bottom of the AI enclosure model and the signal repeater is installed on articulated hinges that may be adjusted to an angle of  $-30^{\circ}$  to  $+210^{\circ}$ . The cabling bundle is installed on the rear of the model installed in the control panel. The signal repeater is installed in a vertical position.

The control switch determines the active cab of the train protection system.

### ▪ Indicators and controls on the front panel of the signal repeater



	NO1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ yellow signal sign in PRE working regime</li><li>▪ required brake line pressure reduction in MEN working regime</li></ul>
	NO2	red signal sign
	NO3	green signal sign
	NO4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ annulus signal sign in PRE working regime</li><li>▪ increased speed regime in MEN working regime</li></ul>
	NO5	vigilance check
	NO6	light intensity sensor
	NO7	75 Hz carrier frequency
	NO8	50 Hz carrier frequency
	NO9	MANUAL / MÁV
	NO10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ ..reduced maximum speed</li><li>▪ ..stopped indicator</li></ul>
	NO11	three-digit alphanumeric display
	NO12	MINUS button
	NO13	PLUS button
	NO14	CONFIRM button

The full names of the indicators are OI1NO1 to OI1NO14 and OI2NO1 to OI2NO14. Abbreviated labels NO1 to NO14 are used in the operating manual to make it easier to read. Context makes clear the distinctions between signal repeater models.

## 6 System Diagnostics

### Four levels of MIREL VZ1 train protection system diagnostics

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**D1 Start-up diagnostic control**

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**D2 Continuous diagnostic control**

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**D3 Functional test**

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**D4 Prophylactic control**

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The first two levels (D1 and D2) are conducted automatically by the system itself. If a fault is detected, the operator is notified of such fact and the system is placed into safe mode. Actions are taken to lock out the system if the discovered fault prevents subsequent operation of the train protection system. System operational repairs (S1) must be conducted when a fault is detected.

A functional test (D3) is conducted by the operator's trained personnel. The functional test checks the overall functionality of the system, meaning the functionality of all indicators and keypads, the functionality of all input and output circuits and cooperation with other equipment on the locomotive (including driving controls, EPV, incremental RPM sensor, pressure sensor, etc.). System operational repairs (S1) must be conducted when a fault is detected. Prophylactic control (D4) of the system is performed periodically by the manufacturer of the train protection system or by other trained persons. In addition to performing the functional test, an in-depth control of the entire system is conducted (measuring input code filters, reading internal variables of the train protection system, checking input/output circuits and checking the devices that work in conjunction with the train protection system). This check is conducted to check the complete functionality of the equipment and for any wear and tear. Operational repairs (S1) or maintenance repairs (S2) are required depending on any faults that may be detected.

Anyone conducting diagnostics of the train protection system must be instructed with regards to occupational safety and must be demonstrably trained to perform such activities with certification to perform the individual levels of MIREL VZ1 train protection system diagnostics.

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## 6.1 D1 – Start-up Diagnostic Control

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### **Purpose:**

This control verifies the status, integrity and functionality of the system during start-up. D1 serves as a daily test if the system is continuously in operation for more than 24 hours.

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### **Execution:**

The train protection system automatically executes this control without intervention.

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### **Schedule:**



Every time the MIREL VZ1 train protection system is switched on with the control repeated after 24 hours of continuous operation of the system.

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### **Description:**

D1 start-up diagnostic control is executed once the system is switched on and diagnoses the functionality of communication inside the central unit, communication between the central unit and signal repeaters, the circuit for signals transmitted from track infrastructure to the on-board equipment, control elements in the engineer's cab and the emergency brake EPV.

D1 start-up diagnostic control is executed every time the system is placed into service and once every 24 hours (daily test) if the system is operated continuously. D1 start-up diagnostic control is executed automatically without intervention on the part of the operator. The control is repeated after the following conditions are met:

- Control is automatically repeated the first time the locomotive stops after 24 hours have passed since the last time the D1 diagnostic control was last completed
- If the locomotive does not reach a speed of zero within 24 to 48 hours of the most recent D1 diagnostic control, the D1 control cannot be repeated and the system detects a fault
- D1 start-up diagnostic control is blocked when the system is operating using EVM specifications in MEN working regime and a speed order of 0 is transmitted until a different speed order is transmitted
- The operator is notified 15 seconds in advance of a repeated D1 start-up diagnostic control by a blinking **D1** code on the signal repeater and acoustic signal ZS10. During this interval, the operator may press the  button to delay the repeat of the D1 start-up diagnostic control for another 15 minutes. If the  button is not pressed, the D1 start-up diagnostic control is automatically started and the control must be completed in full.

The D1 start-up diagnostic control includes check of the circuits for the transmission of signals from track infrastructure to the on-board equipment of the train protection system. When executing this portion of the D1 start-up diagnostic control, the transmission of information from track infrastructure is not active, even if the system is in working regime. The time to check the circuits for signal transmission from track infrastructure is approximately 90 seconds from the start of the D1 control.

The D1 start-up diagnostic control includes a check of the functionality of the EPV on the emergency brake valve. The system activates the opening of the emergency brake EPV two times, which results in two brief drops in air pressure in the main brake pipe. Prerequisites for completing the emergency brake EPV functionality check are completion of the control switch test, switching the control switch in the active cab, releasing the locomotive's direct acting pneumatic brake and the system may not be stand-by regime.

D1 start-up diagnostic control includes diagnostics of the input signals from cab controls. The operator is forced to manipulate the controls as notified by four short acoustic signals and the **D1** code on both signal repeaters. If the operator does not perform the defined ac-



tion with the controls, the train protection system cannot be switched to working regime in either cab. This process involves the following controls:


- Control switch in the cab
- Directional lever or other direction selector
- Input from the pressure switch on the direct acting brake

The operator in the active cab is obliged to conduct the following manipulations of the controls during every D1 control:

- Move the control switch to the OFF position with the control switch in the inactive cab simultaneously in the off position,
- Move the directional lever into the neutral position,
- Move the directional lever into the FORWARD position,
- Move the directional lever into the BACKWARD position,
- Engage the auxiliary brake,
- Release the auxiliary brake.


The order of these control manipulations is not fixed and the directional lever changes and the auxiliary brake operation must be performed with the control switch in the on position. Control manipulations are performed in the active locomotive cab.

The procedure for executing the individual diagnostic steps is indicated on the signal repeater by the seven-segment column in front of the D1 code. The given step has not been completed if the segment is still lit. The segment goes out when all given requirements for the specific step have been met. The meanings of the individual segments are as follows:

	Position	Description
	1st row	Signal repeater communicates with the central unit
	2nd row	Both control switches are in their null position
	3rd row	Directional lever in the active cab in null position and 1st direction (forward or backward depending on type of locomotive)
	4th row	Directional lever in the active cab in null position and 2nd direction (backward or forward depending on type of locomotive)
	5th row	Auxiliary brake has performed both functions (engaged, released)
	6th row	Opening the valve in the first part of the EPV test using channel M caused required decrease in pressure in main brake pipe
	7th row	Opening the valve in the second part of the EPV test using channel M caused required decrease in pressure in main brake pipe

Once all of the steps above have been completed, the D1 control indicator on the signal repeater is off and the system switches into working regime.

The locomotive is prevented from moving in any direction if the pressure in the main brake pipe is higher than 3.5 bar during the D1 start-up diagnostic control. If the locomotive moves, the system intervenes by opening the emergency brake EPV and sounding the ZS11 acoustic signal during the time the locomotive is moving. All of the completed steps of the D1 control are then rendered invalid. After the locomotive stops, the acoustic signal switches off and the operator must repeat the entire D1 control in full. The system closes the emergency brake EPV after the completion of the control switch test.

 The system checks for the presence of a MIREL STB functional gateway when conducting the D1 start-up diagnostic control. Initiating communication with MIREL STB is indicated by a red dot in the left segment of display NO11. If communication with MIREL STB is not initiated during the execution of the D1 control, the system does



not initiate communication with MIREL STB in subsequent operation and works independently.

If train protection system diagnostics detect a system fault (with the exception of a communication fault with the signal repeater in the inactive cab), the system is placed into safe mode and signal repeater displays NO11 in both cabs display **ERR**. The system is placed into safe mode by activating both output channels to control the EPV.

List of tests conducted within start-up diagnostic control:

**Program integrity check** – the system calculates the checksums in memory containing the saved programs and compares them to the expected values. Memory fault error codes are: **E03, E40, E42, E43, E44, E45** or **E46**. The system is not functional during this test.

**Program parameter integrity check** – the system calculates the checksums in memory containing the saved program parameters and compares them to the expected values. Memory fault error codes are: **E02** or **E03**. The system is not functional during this test.

**Processor working register functionality check** – a read and write test for all bit combinations of data in all registers of all processors. The error code for this fault is: **E41**.

**RAM functionality check** – a read and write test for all bit combinations of data in all memory cells of all processors. The error code for this fault is: **E41**.

**Communication check between PMM processor modules and the PMC central unit** – the PMM processor module sends a SYNC packet to initiate communication with the PMC processor module. If communication is not initiated within 5 seconds, the error code is: **E34**. The system is functional during this test.

**Communication check between the central unit and the signal repeaters** – the PMM processor module of the central unit sends a SYNC packet to initiate communication with the signal repeaters. If communication is not initiated with the active station within 5 seconds, the error code is **E04** or **E05**. The system is functional during this test.

**Check of transmission routes to monitor information from track infrastructure** – the system tests transmission filters, the connections of sensors and the sensors themselves in both transmission channels. The test involves 24 steps. A progression of combinations of the following parameters is defined:

Transmission channel:	M, C
Carrier frequency:	50 Hz, 75 Hz
Transmission route from cab:	ST1, ST2
Signal intensity:	low, moderate, high

The full scope of the transmission route test is only conducted in the full scale if the locomotive is standing in a section of track where there is no signal sign transmission. If the system detects a 50 Hz or 75 Hz carrier frequency in the track circuit, this step of the test is skipped. The error code is: **E07**.

The system is functional during this test. There is no transmission of information from the track infrastructure if the system is switched into PRE or MEN working regime during the execution of the transmission route check.

**Emergency brake EPV functionality check** – the system executes a check of EPV control using both channels. The test is performed in two steps. The EPV is opened briefly when the locomotive's brake is first released, first using channel M and then channel C. The system evaluates the drop in pressure in the main pipe and compares it to the expected values. The error code: **E08**. The system is functional during this test.

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**Completion protocol:**

Not issued.

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**Resolving nonconformity:**

If any fault is detected during the start-up diagnostic test, simply switch off the circuit breaker for the train protection system for at least 5 seconds and then re-energise the equipment to re-initialise the equipment. **Any fault displayed after re-initialising the equipment prevents subsequent operation of the train protection system.** Operational repairs (S1) are required.

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## 6.2 D2 – Continuous Diagnostic Control

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### **Purpose:**

This control verifies the status, integrity and functionality of the system during its operation.

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### **Execution:**

The train protection system automatically executes this control without intervention by the operator or maintenance.

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### **Schedule:**

During the operation of the train protection system

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### **Description:**

The train protection system executes continuous diagnostics using both watchdog circuits comparing evaluations of channels M and C in the central unit, comparing the indicator and control channel in the signal repeaters and conducting other continuous tests that check for proper operation of the train protection system. The train protection system continuously compares the results of the main (PMM) and comparison (PMC) processor module. Continuous self-diagnostics detect a system fault in the event of differences and place the train protection system into safe mode. Communication between the central unit and the signal repeaters is another operation that the train protection system diagnoses continuously. The train protection system blocks subsequent operation in the event of a serious communication fault involving the signal repeater in the active cab (where the control switch is on). If a communication fault is detected in the signal repeater at the inactive cab, the system will continue to operate in a limited scope and operational repairs are required.

Tests conducted during continuous self-diagnostic controls:

**Watchdog circuit test** – both processor modules of the central unit and all signal repeater modules are equipped with a pair of watchdog circuits. One monitors the proper operation of the processor itself and the second monitors the operation of the processor in cooperation with the other circuits. Watchdog circuits monitor the proper operation of the processors, correct execution of the program, timer activity and the functionality of processor interruption systems. The watchdog circuits operate with a time base of 16 ms and 100 ms. When a watchdog fault is detected, the given functional block is re-initialised and an error message is generated for the entire system. The error code for a fault involving a processor module (PMM, PMC) of the central unit is **E01**. The error code for a fault involving a signal repeater indicator module is **E03**. The error code for a fault involving a signal repeater control module is **E50**.

**Integrity test of defined operating parameters** – the central unit and the signal repeater permanently monitor for consistency between defined parameters and the valid parameters in the central unit. This concerns the selected working regime and the defined train speed setting. The time limit for matching the defined and valid parameters is 1 second. If the parameters are inconsistent during system operation (e.g. there is a communication fault between the central unit and a signal repeater) or if the central unit does not confirm the accepted newly set parameters within the defined period of time, the system detects an integrity fault of the defined parameters and the corresponding error code is **E31** or **E03**. Evaluation channels M and C in the central unit mutually compare the active working regime. A fault is detected if the active working regime is inconsistent between channels M and C for longer than 3 seconds and the error code is **E27**. The active working regime in both channels is permanently tested against the configuration permissions for the specific train protection system application. The system detects a fault if the active working regime is



not consistent with the configured permissions (prohibited for the given configuration) and the error code is **E28**.

**Communication functionality test** – each unit continuously monitors the functionality of data communication on the RS485 link. The system reports a communication fault if the PMC processor module or any signal repeater module does not receive the correct data packet from the PMM module after more than 5 seconds. The system also reports a communication fault if the PMM processor module does not receive the correct response packet from any other module after 50 attempts. The system detects one of the following error codes: **E04, E05, E06, E03, E50, E51** or **E00**. If a MIREL STB functional gateway is detected during the start-up of the system, the train protection system checks the functionality of communication with the functional gateway during system operation. A loss of channel M communication with the MIREL STB functional gateway is considered a fault and the error code is **E80**. A loss of channel C communication with the MIREL STB functional gateway is considered a fault and the error code is **E81**. Should a MIREL SHPE cooperating device be enabled in the system by the configuration, the train protection checks the functionality of their communication during entire further system operation. In case of communication loss between MIREL SHPE device and M-channel, the system detects and indicates error **E85**. In case of communication loss between MIREL SHPE device and C-channel, the system detects and indicates error **E86**.

**Train protection system intervention integrity test** – the system continuously compares the results of channels M and C of the central unit with a frequency of 10 Hz. A fault is detected if there is a difference in results when monitoring train protection system intervention for longer than 5 seconds and the error code is **E10**.

**Maximum permitted speed evaluation integrity test** – the system continuously compares the results of channels M and C of the central unit with a frequency of 10 Hz. A fault is detected if the difference in speed exceeds  $5 \text{ km}\cdot\text{h}^{-1}$  when evaluating maximum permitted speed for longer than 180 seconds and the error code is **E14**.

**Signal sign transmission integrity test** – the system continuously compares the results of channels M and C of the central unit with a frequency of 10 Hz. A fault is detected if the difference in the results when decoding transmitted signal signs or speed orders exists for longer than 20 seconds and the error code is **E15**.

**Speed measurement test** – speed measurements are completed using the four-channel incremental RPM sensor. Actual instantaneous speed is calculated from measurement channels 1, 2 and 3 and 4 in both evaluation channels (M and C). The calculated speeds are compared and every evaluation channel works with the higher of the two calculated speeds. A fault is detected if the difference between the measured speeds is larger than 20 pulses from the sensor and the error code is **E20**. The mutual comparison of results in both evaluation channels continues. A fault is detected if the difference in the speeds measured by channels M and C is greater than  $2 \text{ km}\cdot\text{h}^{-1}$  for more than 10 seconds and the error code is **E25**.

**Pressure measurement test** – the pressure sensor in the main brake pipe is connected to the system by a 4-20 mA current circuit. The system continuously tests the upper and lower limits. A fault is detected if the limit values are exceeded and the error code is **E24**. The mutual comparison of results in both evaluation channels continues. A fault is detected if the difference in the pressure measured by channels M and C is greater than 0.2 bar for more than 20 seconds and the error code is **E26**. The final main brake pipe pressure test checks for conformity between pressure and the movement of the locomotive. A fault is detected if pressure in the main brake pipe is less than 0.5 bar and the locomotive accelerates to more than 10 km/h and the error code is **E12**.



**Actual direction of travel evaluation test** – the conformity of direction of travel measurements are checked in the same way as speed measurements. The error code is **E21** if the evaluated directions do not match for a period of 3 seconds.

**EPV check during train protection system intervention** – the EPV valve is opened using channel M if train protection system intervention is activated. The decrease in pressure in the main pipe is then measured and compared to the expected values. EPV opening is activated using channel C and if there is low pressure in the main pipe, a fault is detected and the error code is **E11**. The expected pressure drop values are pressure of less than 4.5 bar within 5 seconds and pressure of less than 3.5 bar within 10 seconds.

**Incremental RPM sensor power test** – the system uses a comparator to test the power to the incremental RPM sensor. A fault is detected if the current draw is too low (power loss) or too high (short circuit) and the error code is **E22**.





**Main pipe pressure sensor power test** – the system uses a window comparator to test the pressure sensor supply voltage. A fault is detected if voltage is too low or too high and the error code is **E23**.

**Test of decoding and processor execution of instructions** – the proper decoding and executing of the applied sub-set of the instruction file of processes is tested by triggering a special diagnostic part of the program, which is conducted cyclically in 4 branches with a comparison of results. A period of 100 ms is required to conduct a single cycle. The testing period for all input data bit combinations is 26 s. A fault is detected in decoding and executing instructions and the error code is **E30**.

**D1 start-up self-diagnostic control completion test** – an error is detected if the complete scope of D1 control is not completed within 4 hours from the moment the train protection system is switched on and the error code is **E09**.

**D1 start-up self-diagnostic control restart test** – an error is reported if the system is unable to restart D1 start-up self-diagnostic control within 24 to 28 hours of the most recent test (if the locomotive has not stopped completely) and the error code is **E32**.

**Signal sign indicator test** – information from the signal repeater indication and control module is compared in the PMM and PMC processor modules of the central unit to detect any nonconformity between the indicated signal sign and the blue light. The error code is **E52**.

**Signal repeater button test** – information from the signal repeater indication and control module is compared in the PMM and PMC processor modules of the central unit to detect any fault in the signal repeater buttons. The error code for a  button fault is **E53**. The error code for a  button fault is **E54**. The error code for a  button fault is **E55**. The system detects an unprompted intervention if the confirmation button  on the signal repeater is improperly operated and the error code is **E56**.

**MIREL STB functional gateway fault detection** – detection is conducted autonomously of the actual functional gateway. The train protection system displays applicable error codes in the range from **E60** to **E75**.

Error detection of MIREL SHPE device – detection is carried out autonomously by device proper. Train protection realizes the indication of respective error code in range from **E90** to **E98**.

**Configuration parameter integrity check** – the system calculates the checksums in memory containing the configuration parameters and compares them to the expected values. The error code for a memory fault is **E33**. Evaluation channels M and C in the central unit mutually compare configuration chains. A fault is detected if the configuration chains are

inconsistent between channels M and C for longer than 10 seconds and the error code is **E34**.

**Check of stand-by regime control inputs** – the system detects any incorrect combinations of stand-by regime control inputs depending on the configuration permissions and the error code is **E82**.

**Status check of recording equipment** – the system checks the communication status and internal status of recording equipment depending on configuration permissions. The error code is **E83**.

**SHP interface test** – the system checks the status of the digital interface with the SHP system depending on the configuration permissions. The train protection system detects an error if an incorrect combination of digital inputs is detected from the SHP system and the error code is **E83**.

**Processor module restart test** – a fault is detected if an uncontrolled repeated start of either of the processor modules, PMM or PMC, in the central unit occurs during the operation of the train protection system; the error code is **E17**. The error code if an uncontrolled restart of the indicator module on the signal repeater in the active cab occurs during operation of the train protection system is **E18**. The error code if an uncontrolled restart of the control module on the signal repeater in the active cab occurs during operation of the train protection system is **E19**.

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**Completion protocol:**

Not issued.

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**Resolving nonconformity:**

If any fault is discovered during the continuous self-diagnostic test, simply switch off the circuit breaker for the train protection system for at least 5 seconds and then re-energise the equipment to re-initialise the equipment. **Any fault displayed after re-initialising the equipment prevents subsequent operation of the train protection system.** Operational repairs (S1) are required.

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## 6.3 D3 – Functional Test

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### **Purpose:**

This test verifies the basic functionality and integrity of the operated system. It also verifies interaction with track infrastructure, the odometer system and the locomotive brake system and verifies the functionality of the operator interface.

### **Execution:**

The train protection system operator's trained personnel or other demonstrably authorised and trained persons

### **Schedule:**

The test is performed regularly at 6-month intervals with a tolerance of 1 month. Execution of the D4 prophylactic control is a substitute for the D3 functional test.





The six-month term re-starts if an unplanned D3 functional test is executed.





The first deadline for conducting a D3 functional test commences on the date on which the system is commissioned on the locomotive.

### **Description:**

The functional test serves to ensure proper operation of all basic functions of the train protection system. The functional test comprises 3 sections:

- A. Preparation and basic functionality
- B. Functionality of defined parameters
- C. Diagnostic TEST regime

The special diagnostic TEST regime is used by the train protection system to perform Section C of the functional test. This regime is selected in the cab by pressing the  button and engaging the control switch. The locomotive must be completely stopped and the system must be in ZAV regime or in a state where D1 self-diagnostics are not under way. Press  to complete a step and move to the next in Section C. Press  to return to the previous step. Press  to activate the given system output in the current step. Switch off the control switch to terminate the TEST regime.

Analogue input parameters (speed and pressure in the main pipe) are controlled with the system in ZAV regime or in a state where D1 self-diagnostics are not under way. Pressing  and  simultaneously shows the speed of the locomotive with precision of 1 km.h<sup>-1</sup> on the NO11 display, while pressing  and  simultaneously displays the pressure in the main brake pipe with accuracy of 0.1 bar on the NO11 display. MIREL VZT test equipment is required to conduct the full scope of the D3 functional test.

Document 206VZ1 has the methodology and template protocol for conducting the D3 functional test on the MIREL VZ1 train protection system.

### **Completion protocol:**

The completion protocol for the functional test must contain the following details:

- Date and site
- Serial number of the system and the central unit
- The number of the locomotive on which the equipment is installed
- The signature of the person who conducted the test
- The result of the functional test (no faults / with faults)

- A description of all faults must be provided
- The signature of the person who conducted the test

---

**Resolving nonconformity:**

Operational repairs of the system (S1) must be conducted when a fault is detected.



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## 6.4 D4 – Prophylactic Control

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### **Purpose:**

This control involves the in-depth verification of the status, integrity and functionality of the system with respect to safety and reliability and verification of the status and interface between the system and the locomotive. It includes conducting D3 functional testing.

### **Execution:**

Manufacturer-trained personnel or other persons demonstrably authorised and trained by the manufacturer explicitly for this purpose.

### **Schedule:**

In case that the previous D4 prophylactic control was performed in the Basic range, the following D4 prophylactic control is performed after 24 months with a tolerance of 2 months.

If the previous D4 prophylactic control was performed in the Extended range, the following D4 prophylactic control is performed during the major repair of locomotive. In specific cases, if the periodicity of the major locomotive repairs exceeds 10 years, the prophylactic D4 control must be carried out no later than 120 months.

The first deadline for a D4 prophylactic control commences on the date of the final check conducted during the removal of the central unit and the signal repeaters of the MIREL VZ1 train protection system from the manufacturer's warehouse. If these components are not removed from stock simultaneously, the deadline begins on the earliest of these dates.

Commissioning, or recommissioning of all components out of service for more than 12 months, must occur if the entire system, its central unit or any MIREL VZ1 train protection system signal repeater is out of service for more than 12 months. Commissioning must be conducted in the scope corresponding to assembly level Z2 at a minimum. The term "out of service" means that the central unit or the signal repeater is not installed on the locomotive or in a test situation or is installed but the system is not powered up over such period of time.

The new interval commences if an unplanned D4 prophylactic control is performed.

If D4 prophylactic control is not completed in full within a single service stop or at different time intervals on the central unit, signal repeaters as well as system interaction with the locomotive, then the new interval for D4 prophylactic control begins on the day on which the first portion of the D4 control was conducted.

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### **Place of inspection:**


Prophylactic inspection D4 of the MIREL VZ1 system can be carried out in one of ways as shown below:

- on drive railway vehicle (DRV)
- Prophylactic device inspection shall be carried out in the Producer's service centre. The prophylactic inspection of system cooperation with DRV shall be carried out on DRV. Device assembly and –disassembly doesn't form an integral part of the D4 prophylactic inspection

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### **Description:**

The execution of D4 prophylactic control is subject to the provisions of a specific internal procedure issued by the manufacturer for in-depth checks of the system. The methodology for performing the D4 prophylactic control is adapted to the different installation conditions for individual classes of locomotives on which the MIREL RM1 VZ1 train protection system



is installed. D4 prophylactic control may be conducted in the standard scope or in an expanded scope for version v04. Any future installations with conditions and difference that have an impact on the scope and procedure for executing the D4 prophylactic control shall be incorporated into D4 prophylactic control methodology.

Documents 675VZ1 and 498VZ1 have the methodology and template protocol for conducting the D4 prophylactic control on the MIREL VZ1 train protection system.

D4 prophylactic control is only conducted in full. In full means that prophylactic control was conducted on the central unit, the signal repeaters and system interaction with the locomotive.

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**Completion protocol:**

The completion protocol for the prophylactic test must contain the following details:

- Date of completion or the completion dates for the individual sections
- Place or places of performance
- The serial numbers of the system and the individual components
- The number of the locomotive on which the equipment is installed
- The name and position of the person who conducted the test
- The results of the prophylactic control
- A description of findings, nonconformity, faults, problems and deficiencies if identified
- Signature of the person who conducted the test

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**Resolving nonconformity:**

If a fault is detected, operational repairs (S1) of the system or maintenance repairs (S2) are required depending on the nature of the detected problem.

## 7 System Maintenance

All train protection system components are maintenance-free. No component needs to be replaced, tuned, or otherwise configured at any time.

### **Two levels of MIREL VZ1 train protection system maintenance**

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S1 Operational repairs

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S2 Maintenance repairs

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Operational repairs (S1) are conducted by the operator's trained personnel. A Repair is performed if any train protection system faults are detected by any level of diagnostics (D1 to D4) or in connection with a fault indicated during operation of the train protection system. Operational repairs serve to remedy faults in cabling, power and connections to peripheral equipment on the locomotive. Operational repairs do not involve any interference inside the central unit or the signal repeaters in the system.

Maintenance repairs (S2) are performed by the manufacturer or persons trained and authorised by the manufacturer. Maintenance repairs are conducted if a fault cannot be resolved by performing operational repairs (S1). Maintenance repairs are always conducted on the basis of replacement (replacing the central unit or signal repeater and subsequent repair by the manufacturer). Maintenance repairs are designed to remedy faults in the central unit and signal repeaters of the train protection system.

Anyone conducting maintenance on the train protection system must be instructed with regards to occupational safety and must be demonstrably trained to perform such activities with certification to perform the individual levels of MIREL VZ1 train protection system maintenance.

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## 7.1 S1 – Operational Repairs

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### **Execution:**

The train protection system operator's trained personnel or other demonstrably authorised and trained persons

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### **Schedule:**

If any train protection system faults are detected by any of the diagnostic controls (D1 to D4) or in connection with a fault indicated during operation of the train protection system.

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### **Description:**

Operational repairs serve to remedy faults in:

- Power to the central unit
- Power to the signal repeaters
- Cabling
- Connection of the incremental RPM sensor
- Connection of the pressure sensor in the main brake pipe
- Code sensor connections
- Connectors
- Connections of input and output circuits
- Dead man's button connections
- Mechanical anchors

The portions of the D3 functional test that can be of assistance in more precisely determining the exact faults involved should be performed before proceeding to S1 operational repairs. Faults involving the central unit of the train protection system or the signal repeaters are resolved by replacing the specific component. Personnel must have approved technical and installation documentation for the system, in addition to the maintenance manual, when conducting operational repairs and must follow the provisions of such documentation for the given class of locomotive.

S2 maintenance repairs are required on the train protection system if S1 operational repairs do not resolve all faults. D3 functional test of the system must be completed if the S1 operational repairs remedy all faults.

All operational repairs must be documented in the maintenance sheet. The maintenance sheet template is provided in document 460M.

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### **Record – maintenance sheet:**

The maintenance sheet for operational repairs must contain the following details:

- Date, time and place
- The serial number of the system and the repaired components
- The number of the locomotive on which the system is installed
- The name of the person conducting the operational repairs
- Description of the faults that have been resolved and their root causes (if known)
- Description of the faults that could not be resolved by operational repairs
- The serial numbers of the removed and installed components
- The signature of the person who conducted the repairs



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## 7.2 S2 – Maintenance Repairs

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### **Execution:**

Personnel trained by the manufacturer

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### **Schedule:**

Perform when the train protection system has faults that cannot be remedied by operational repairs S1.

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### **Description:**

Maintenance repairs serve to remedy faults in:

- The central unit of the train protection system
- Signal repeaters
- Train protection system horns
- Cooperation between the train protection system and cooperating equipment and other components of the locomotive that could not be remedied with S1 operational repairs

The D3 functional test must be completed after the maintenance repairs and a record for such test must be completed. All maintenance repairs must be documented in the maintenance sheet. The maintenance sheet template is provided in document 460M.


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### **Record – maintenance sheet:**

The completion protocol for maintenance repairs must contain the following details:


- Date, time and place
- The serial number of the system and the repaired components
- The number of the locomotive on which the equipment is installed
- The name of the person conducting the maintenance repairs
- Description of the faults that have been resolved and their root causes (if known)
- The serial numbers of removed and installed components (if applicable)
- The signature of the person who conducted the repairs

## 8 Faults






Train protection faults are divided into two groups. Specifically there are faults that prevent subsequent use of the train protection system and faults that restrict subsequent use of the train protection system. The system is automatically switched into safe mode when a fault that prevents subsequent use of the system is detected; the EPV opens and the emergency brake is activated. The **ERR** (ZJ8) indicator lights on the front panel of the central unit. When a fault occurs, the operator should first switch off the train protection system circuit breaker for at least 5 seconds and then switch it back on to re-initialise the train protection system. If the fault appears again, the locomotive operator should not take any additional action to remedy the fault.

After re-initialising the system, it should be noted that the system operates using the pre-set operating parameters.

For more precise troubleshooting, the error code can be displayed by pushing the  button (NO14) on the signal repeater in the active cab showing a fault to bring up with numbered system error code. The faults detected by system diagnostics are presented in the following table.

### Faults that prevent subsequent use of the train protection system:

<b>E00</b>	Permanent loss of primary signal repeater module communication with the central unit
<b>E01</b>	Fault detected by central unit WD-type watchdog circuits
<b>E02</b>	Central unit EEPROM memory fault
<b>E03</b>	General fault of signal repeater primary module in the active cab <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ fault detected by WD-type watchdog circuits</li><li>▪ FLASH, EEPROM, RAM memory fault</li><li>▪ faults in decoding and processor execution of instructions</li><li>▪ communication fault</li><li>▪ fault in integrity of configured parameters</li></ul>
<b>E04</b>	Fault in central unit communication with signal repeater primary module in cab 1
<b>E05</b>	Fault in central unit communication with signal repeater primary module in cab 2
<b>E06</b>	Fault in communication between central unit processor modules
<b>E07</b>	Fault in code monitoring transmission route detected by D1 start-up diagnostics
<b>E08</b>	EPV fault detected by D1 start-up diagnostics
<b>E09</b>	Fault if D1 start-up diagnostics are not completed within 4 hours from switching on the system
<b>E10</b>	Intervention integrity fault between central unit processor modules
<b>E11</b>	EPV fault during a train protection system intervention – low pressure drop in main brake pipe
<b>E12</b>	Locomotive movement at low pressure in main brake pipe
<b>E14</b>	Integrity fault in maximal speed evaluation
<b>E15</b>	Integrity fault in transmitted signal sign evaluation based on LS specifications or speed command evaluation based on EVM specifications
<b>E17</b>	Start-up fault in central unit processor modules
<b>E18</b>	Start-up fault in signal repeater primary module in the active cab
<b>E19</b>	Start-up fault in signal repeater control module in the active cab
<b>E20</b>	Instantaneous speed measurement fault

<b>E21</b>	Fault in assessment of actual direction of travel
<b>E22</b>	Power fault in incremental RPM sensor
<b>E23</b>	Fault in main brake pipe pressure sensor
<b>E24</b>	Main brake pipe pressure measurement fault
<b>E25</b>	Actual speed integrity fault between channels M and C
<b>E26</b>	Main brake pipe integrity fault between channels M and C
<b>E27</b>	Defined working regime integrity fault between channels M and C
<b>E28</b>	Requested working regime integrity fault – request for unauthorised working regime
<b>E30</b>	Faults in decoding and processor execution of instructions
<b>E31</b>	Integrity fault involving set operating parameters
<b>E32</b>	Repeated D1 diagnostic test start fault
<b>E33</b>	Train protection system configuration data integrity fault
<b>E34</b>	Configuration data integrity fault between channels M and C
<b>E35</b>	D4 diagnostic test validity fault
<b>E36</b>	Fault in system real time setting
<b>E40</b>	Central unit FLASH memory fault
<b>E41</b>	Central unit RAM memory fault
<b>E42</b>	Software integrity fault – UNI section
<b>E43</b>	Software integrity fault – LS section
<b>E44</b>	Software integrity fault – EVM section
<b>E45</b>	Software integrity fault – SHP section
<b>E46</b>	Software integrity fault – STB section
	General fault of signal repeater control module in the active cab
<b>E50</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ fault detected by WD-type watchdog circuits</li> <li>▪ FLASH, EEPROM, RAM memory fault</li> <li>▪ faults in decoding and processor execution of instructions</li> <li>▪ communication fault</li> </ul>
<b>E51</b>	Communication fault involving signal repeater control module in the active cab
<b>E52</b>	Integrity fault in signal sign indicator on the signal repeater in the active cab
<b>E53</b>	Fault in functionality of  button on signal repeater in the active cab
<b>E54</b>	Fault in functionality of  button on signal repeater in the active cab
<b>E55</b>	Fault in functionality of  button on signal repeater in the active cab
<b>E56</b>	Fault involving an unexpected termination of system intervention
	General fault of MIREL STB gateway – channel M
<b>E60</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ faults detected by WD-type watchdog circuits</li> <li>▪ FLASH, EEPROM, RAM memory faults</li> <li>▪ faults in decoding and processor execution of instructions</li> </ul>
<b>E61</b>	Integrity fault involving the requested working regime of the MIREL STB gateway – channel M and the actual MIREL VZ1 working regime
<b>E62</b>	integrity fault involving the requested working regime between MIREL STB channels M and C detected by channel M
	General communication fault of MIREL STB gateway – channel M
<b>E63</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ communication fault between MIREL STB and MIREL VZ1</li> <li>▪ communication fault between channels M and C</li> </ul>
<b>E64</b>	Communication fault between MIREL STB – channel M with the ETCS system



<b>E65</b>	General ETCS system command fault detected by MIREL STB – channel M <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ETCS system requests DA mode for more than one STM module</li> <li>▪ ETCS system request FA mode for all STM modules</li> </ul>
<b>E70</b>	General fault of MIREL STB gateway – channel C <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ faults detected by WD-type watchdog circuits</li> <li>▪ FLASH, EEPROM, RAM memory faults</li> <li>▪ faults in decoding and processor execution of instructions</li> </ul>
<b>E71</b>	Integrity fault involving the requested working regime of the MIREL STB gateway – channel C and the actual MIREL VZ1 working regime
<b>E72</b>	Integrity fault involving the requested working regime between MIREL STB channels M and C detected by channel C
<b>E73</b>	General communication fault of MIREL STB gateway – channel C <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ communication fault between MIREL STB and MIREL VZ1</li> <li>▪ communication fault between channels M and C</li> </ul>
<b>E74</b>	Communication fault between MIREL STB – channel C with the ETCS system
<b>E75</b>	General ETCS system command fault detected by MIREL STB – channel C <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ETCS system requests DA mode for more than one STM module</li> <li>▪ ETCS system request FA mode for all STM modules</li> </ul>
<b>E80</b>	Communication fault with MIREL STB – channel M detected by the MIREL VZ1 system
<b>E81</b>	Communication fault with MIREL STB – channel C detected by the MIREL VZ1 system
<b>E82</b>	Integrity fault involving the digital inputs used to control stand-by regime
<b>E83</b>	General fault of the recording equipment
<b>E84</b>	Integrity fault involving the interface with the SHP system
<b>E85</b>	Error of communication with MIREL SHPE generator – M-channel, detected by MIREL VZ1 system
<b>E86</b>	Error of communication with MIREL SHPE generator – C-channel, detected by MIREL VZ1 system
<b>E90</b>	Combined error of MIREL SHPE generator – channel M <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Errors detected by watchdog circuits</li> <li>▪ Errors of decoding and of processor instruction execution</li> <li>▪ Errors of internal communication with peripherals circuits</li> <li>▪ Errors of FLASH, EEPROM, RAM memories</li> </ul> Power supply errors
<b>E91</b>	Integrity error between M and C channels of MIREL SHPE generator – M-channel
<b>E92</b>	Error of communication of MIREL SHPE generator – M-channel
<b>E93</b>	Antenna error of MIREL SHPE generator – M-channel
<b>E95</b>	Combined error of MIREL SHPE generator – channel C extent of combined error identical like with <b>E90</b>
<b>E96</b>	Integrity error between M and C channels of MIREL SHPE generator - C-channel
<b>E97</b>	Communication error of MIREL SHPE generator – C-channel
<b>E98</b>	Antenna error of MIREL SHPE generator – C-channel

The EPV does not open and the emergency brake does not activate in the event of a fault that restricts subsequent use of the system. No fault is indicated on the front panel of the central unit or on the signal repeater. In this case, the fault involves the signal repeater in the inactive cab. These faults only restrict the operation of the train protection system to the cab in which the signal repeater that is operating normally is installed.

All faults detected during operations in ZAV working regime while in motion are classified as faults restricting subsequent use of the system. These faults are then reclassified depending



on type into faults preventing subsequent use of the system after the vehicle is stopped. The EPV is opened after the locomotive has stopped due to the detection of a fault in ZAV regime.

**Faults restricting subsequent use of the train protection system indicated on the signal repeater in the inactive cab:**

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- E00** general fault of signal repeater primary module in the active cab
- fault detected by WD-type watchdog circuits
  - FLASH, EEPROM, RAM memory fault
  - faults in decoding and processor execution of instructions
  - communication fault
-

---

## 9 Monitored Axle Diameter Configuration

The portable diagnostic computer is used to configure the diameter of the monitored locomotive axle. The computer is connected to the central unit of the train protection system using the SAI connector on the rear panel of the central unit or by connecting it to the MIREL RM1 speed recorder. Configuration is performed by the MIREL KAM program on the diagnostic computer. Communication between the diagnostic computer and the train protection system is indicated on the computer screen and by indicator ZJ5 on the front panel of the central unit. The user manual provided for the MIREL KAM software suite guides the actual configuration of the equipment.

The periodicity for configuring the diameter of the wheel on the monitored axle of the locomotive is defined by the operator's regulations.

## 10 Data reading from recording equipment


Depending on the configuration of the system, one of the options for integrating the registration device is directly via the RS485 communication bus, using a recording module integrated into the VZ1ZJ base unit device.

In the case of configuring a system with hardware of base unit with replaceable storage medium of the recording module, this registered data module is accessible from the front panel of the base unit. Removing the memory card is done by pushing it and then pulling it out of the slot. To return the memory card, insert it into the slot and push the card fully in.

The system time for registration is set automatically when the system is configured, according to the time on PC which the configuration is performed with. For a more detailed specification of the time setting conditions during system configuration, see the document 547MAP.

The presentation of the recorded data from the removable storage medium is performed in the MAP programming environment using the MAN module. A detailed specification is given in 1997MAP.

### ▪ Indicating units of base unit recording equipment



BOX3U

BOXKOG/BOXTUG

<b>CLK</b>	ZJ9	activity indication of recording equipment
<b>ERR</b>	ZJ10	failure of recording equipment

The full labeling of indicators is OIZJ9 and OIZJ10. For the sake of clarity the operating instructions are shortened the designation ZJ9 and ZJ10.

## 11 Installation and Disassembly

After performing the assembly steps, it is necessary to carry out the D3 Test.

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### Central unit installation and removal

The central unit is mounted using 4 M6 bolts along the sides of the front panel. A 72-pin DD connector with 2 locking latches and a DB connector are located on the rear wall of the central processing unit. The battery source of the locomotive must be switched off or the circuit breaker for the train protection system must be switched off when installing and removing the train protection system. The installation procedure follows:

- Connect the 72-pin DD connector
- Close the latches on the connector
- Connect the DB connector
- Position in the desired location
- Install and fasten the mounting bolts

Reverse this procedure to remove.

---

### Signal repeater installation and removal

The signal repeater is inserted into an enclosure in the locomotive control panel and is secured with a pair of mounts. A terminal strip is located on the rear of the unit for connecting electrical cabling. The battery source of the locomotive must be switched off or the train protection system circuit breaker must be switched off when installing and removing a signal repeater. The installation procedure follows:

- Install the unit into the metal enclosure
- Install the mounts
- Connect cabling to terminal strip on the unit
- Position the enclosure in the desired position
- Mount the enclosure to the control panel in the cab (depending on type of locomotive)

Reverse this procedure to remove.

---

### Installation and removal of a stand-alone model horn

The horn is mounted on hinges secured with 2 M4 bolts. A terminal strip is installed on the rear of the enclosure. The battery source of the locomotive must be switched off or the circuit breaker for the device must be switched off during installation and removal. The installation procedure follows:

- Connect the terminal strip on the rear of the enclosure
- Position in the desired location
- Install and fasten the mounting bolts

Reverse this procedure to remove.

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### Installation and removal of a control panel mounted horn

The instructions for installing a signal repeater into the control panel are used.



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## 12 Notes